EXHIBIT 1

```
1
                 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 2
                           DISTRICT OF UTAH
 3
                           CENTRAL DIVISION
 4
 5
     CAPANA SWISS ADVISORS, A.G., a )
 6
     Swiss corporation, et al.,
 7
                 Plaintiffs,
                                     ) Case No. 2:23-CV-467TS
 8
     VS.
 9
     RYMARK, a Utah corporation, )
10
     et al.,
                                     )
                 Defendants.
11
12
13
14
                BEFORE THE HONORABLE CECILIA M. ROMERO
15
16
                            October 2, 2024
17
18
                            Motion Hearing
19
20
21
           Transcript of Electronically Recorded Proceedings
22
23
24
25
```

	200 2:20 00 00 101 10 01111	3 of 20
4		3 01 23
1		
2		APPEARANCES
3		
4	For Plaintiffs:	ERIK A. CHRISTIANSEN
5		201 South Main Street Suite 1800
6		Salt Lake City, Utah
7		SARAH E. DIAMOND 2049 Century Park East
8		Suite 2300 Los Angeles, California
9	(molonboni colly)	JOHN WORDEN
10	(Telephonically)	101 California Street
11		Suite 3800 San Francisco, California
12		
13		
14	For Defendants:	CHAD PEHRSON STEPHEN RICHARDS
15		50 West Broadway Suite 1000
16		Salt Lake City, Utah
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22	Court Transcriber:	Ed Young 351 South West Temple
		Room 3.302
23		Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2180 801-328-3202
24		ed_young@utd.uscourts.gov
25		

October 2, 2024 1 2 PROCEEDINGS 3 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 4 5 We're here in the matter of Capana Swiss Advisors versus Rymark, et al., case number 2:23-CV-467. 6 7 If I could ask counsel to make their notice of 8 appearance. Who is present on behalf of the plaintiffs? 9 MS. DIAMOND: Good afternoon. Sarah Diamond and Erik Christiansen on behalf of the plaintiffs. 10 11 THE COURT: Thank you. 12 For the defendants? 13 MR. PEHRSON: Your Honor, my name is Chad Pehrson. 14 My colleague Stephen Richards is with me and we are with the K.B. and A. lawfirm. 15 16 THE COURT: Thank you. 17 Pending before the Court are a number of motions 18 that I have spent the last few days reviewing. Normally I 19 would hear argument from you all, but the Court is actually 20 prepared to make rulings on all of those, and you'll 21 understand why I'm not hearing argument when I make those 22 rulings, but before I do that I have a point of clarification. 2.3 24 In looking at my notes it appears still 25 outstanding, and the Court took under advisement ECF docket

```
number 68, the defendants' motion to quash, and it is my
 1
 2
     intention to issue an oral ruling on that via Zoom, bringing
 3
     the parties back hopefully on Friday of this week, just so I
     get myself a deadline to get that done. I just wanted to
 4
 5
     make sure that that was still a live issue.
 6
               Mr. Pehrson, is that motion still alive and
 7
     pending from your perspective?
 8
               MR. PEHRSON: Yes, Your Honor.
 9
               THE COURT: All right. And the same question to
10
     you, Ms. Diamond.
11
               MS. DIAMOND: Yes, Your Honor.
12
               THE COURT: All right.
                                       Thank you.
13
               So what I'm inclined to do then is to have us get
14
     on a Zoom call for the Court to issue an oral ruling on that
15
              I'm hoping to do that on Friday of this week, and
16
     let me just pull up my calender, at 2:00 p.m.
17
               Mr. Pehrson, does that work for you?
18
               MR. PEHRSON: Yes, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: All right. Ms. Diamond and Mr.
19
20
     Christiansen, does that work for both of you?
               MS. DIAMOND: Yes, Your Honor.
21
                          What I will do then is we'll have a
22
               THE COURT:
23
     docket entry setting that motion for an oral ruling on
24
     Friday at 2:00 p.m. via Zoom. The Zoom link will also be
25
     issued.
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

My deputy just handed me a note and indicated that it appears that we also have individuals on the phone. I want to make sure that we note who that is. Mr. Christiansen, are you able to answer that question? I see you shaking your head yes. MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I think Sarah can answer it. THE COURT: Ms. Diamond? MS. DIAMOND: Yes, Your Honor. We have our client, Shaen Bernhardt, and I believe John Worden, another attorney from Venable, is on the line. I am not sure if there is one or two. THE COURT: So your client Bernhardt and Worden, who is an attorney. Is that correct? MS. DIAMOND: Correct. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Pehrson, anyone on the line from your perspective? MR. PEHRSON: Not that I'm aware of. THE COURT: Thank you. I am going to issue rulings on all of the pending motions except ECF-68, which I have indicated I will rule on this Friday. I'm going to ask the parties to carefully track to ensure that I have addressed each and every one of those. If I have missed one, please indicate that to me at the end. All right.

As I have indicated, I have read everything over the last few days. When I was reading everything I thought I would cancel the hearing and just issue written rulings, but then I was reminded that I told you all at the June hearing that when I get the quantity and contentious nature of the motions that you have all filed, that I would bring you down to court and have you come down to court, which is what I'm doing today.

I will also add that this is not the first time that the Court has had to remind the parties of their obligations to meet and confer and that this Court will start to impose sanctions. It appears that reminders need to be given again. Local Rule 37-1 requires the parties to make reasonable efforts to resolve a discovery dispute before seeking court assistance. At a minimum, those efforts must include a prompt written communication sent to the opposing party identifying the discovery issues, specifying why those responses and objections are inadequate, and requesting a meet and confer either in person or by phone, including suggested dates and times.

Pending before the Court for the plaintiffs is one motion to seal, ECF-110, and four short form discovery motions, ECF-111, 114, 116 and 121.

For the defendants one motion to seal, ECF-140, which is unopposed, and five short form discovery motions,

ECF-112, 117, 128, 129 and 136. Setting aside the two motions to seal, so ECF-110 and 140, in all other pending motions it is clear that the parties have not complied with local Rule 37-1.

In fact, with respect to the certifications, both parties concede that they have not been able to meet and confer in person or by phone. Rule 37-1 is not discretionary, but is mandatory. It is shocking that these motions would have been filed without reading this mandatory rule. In reviewing the pending motions, it appears if the parties could have set aside their animus towards one another, some of these could have been resolved or narrowed without involving the Court.

With the exception of the motions to seal, again, ECF-110 and 140, each of the plaintiffs' motions, so ECF-111, 114, 116 and 121, as well as each of the defendants' motions, 112, 117, 128, 129 and 136 are denied for failure to meet and confer.

In addition, as I assume some of these motions may intend to come back to the Court, the Court makes further additional rulings and/or provides some guidance to the parties. With regard to the defendants' short form motion, ECF-112, in addition to being denied for failure to meet and confer, ECF-112 is also denied because an outright refusal to meet and confer unless calls are recorded is unreasonable

and interferes with the litigation process and violates counsels' obligations under the discovery rules and as officers of the court. As this Court has already stated, local Rule 37-1 is not discretionary but mandatory.

The Court also finds that the defendants have provided no specific examples of alleged improper or false accusations by plaintiffs' counsel. Instead, what is apparent by all of these pending motions is that neither side is engaging as these rules require. There appears to be some animosity, and as a result neither party's counsel is engaging in the professional manner this Court requires and orders you to adhere to going forward.

This behavior stops today. This is a court of law which the parties are welcome to come before where there are legitimate disputes for the Court to decide after complying with their meet and confer obligations. The Court will not babysit the parties, nor will the Court allow one another to depose each other, but, rather, orders the parties to engage professionally with one another through the meet and confer process.

I am going to order as of today that the meet and confer process is to take place in person, not via Zoom or over the phone, in the hope that in person meetings lowers any animosity between the parties.

I know, Ms. Diamond, that you are not local

counsel and you reside outside of the State of Utah, so you are permitted to attend via Zoom over the phone with Mr.

Christensen, but local counsel is ordered to meet and confer in person to discuss any pending issues going forward.

We can revisit that once you all start to engage like the professionals I know that you are. I will stress that some of the issues before this Court could absolutely have been resolved if you had met and conferred without imputing any bad faith or ill will and just discuss the issues and the applicable legal standards and listen to one another and, where necessary, cooperate and make concessions and narrow the issues.

I also want to make it clear going forward for any discovery issues that come before me consistent with Rule 37, I will consider it a violation of a court order subject to contempt or other sanctions if any further motions are filed without meeting and conferring in person. I have already reminded you at the last hearing that I would award attorneys' fees and other sanctions. I tried to do that here but, frankly, found that they would just cross each other out, because both of the parties have failed to meet and confer in good faith.

That is regarding ECF-112.

Regarding defendants' motion, ECF-117, the motion to compel overlength briefs, the Court also denies that

motion, because the purpose of the meet and confer process is to narrow the issues before bringing them to the Court. The Court will not consider a request to file an overlength brief where you have not met your obligation to meet and confer and determine if the issues can be narrowed. For this additional reason the motion is also denied.

With respect to ECF-128, the motion to quash overbroad subpoenas, in addition to being denied for failure to meet and confer, I want to provide some additional guidance. First, the Court would note that in looking at the subpoenas they appear to be very broad, which the parties needed to discuss to determine if they could be narrowed.

Second, the defendants indicate that perhaps with respect to some of the requests they are unnecessary as they may be able to produce the documents, which the parties are specifically ordered to discuss, and, third, if there are accusations of spoliation and refusal to produce, those need to be fully addressed and supported. The Court does not want to see any baseless accusations by any party going forward.

Finally, if a motion is filed, it needs to address standing of the objecting party and also the full legal standard. So that is the additional guidance that the Court provides with respect to ECF-128.

With respect to ECF-129, the motion to compel the Colshorn deposition, and I hope I'm saying that name right, and in addition to being denied for failure to meet and confer, the Court also gives the parties some guidance. I tend to not look outside of the Tenth Circuit for cases unless there is a reason for me to do so. The brief cites to cases outside of the Tenth Circuit with no explanation if there are in fact controlling or persuasive cases with a fact pattern within the Tenth Circuit or district courts within the Tenth Circuit.

If the motion is refiled, I will need to understand why the Court would follow cases outside of the Tenth Circuit. I generally never look to the Ninth Circuit. It is not a circuit that we tend to follow here. All right.

With respect to the motion to quash regarding the deposition notice, ECF-136, and that is also the defendants' motion, in addition to being denied for failure to meet and confer, the Court also denies the motion as the defendants have failed to address how they have standing to challenge the deposition of William Bower, a vice president of Oak Street.

As set forth in the Hutchinson versus Kamauu case, which is a 2022 WestLaw at 180641 case from the District of Utah from January 20th of 2022, a motion to quash a subpoena may only be made by the party to whom it is directed. The

exception to this rule is where the party seeking to challenge the subpoena has a personal right or privilege with respect to the subject matter requested in the subpoena. That comes from the same case.

However, even when a party has standing to quash a subpoena based on privilege or a personal right, he or she lacks standing to object on the basis of undue burden and on the grounds of overbreadth and relevance. That comes from Monroe versus FinWise Bank, a 2021 Westlaw case, 5926416, a District of Utah case from December 15th of 2021. The defendants have failed to address standing and any exceptions and for this additional reason ECF-136 is denied.

With respect to defendants' motion to seal at ECF-140, no opposition was filed and it is, therefore, granted. I would note that this is a motion to seal and the Court does not find that any discussion about the properness of the designations to be appropriately addressed in the motion to seal and, therefore, declines to do so. All right.

Now, turning back to the plaintiffs' motion, the plaintiffs' motion to seal, ECF-110, the Court first makes it clear that to the extent that the defendants seek affirmative relief in the opposition, with the argument that the plaintiffs violated the protective order with a blanket designation of every page of every document, the Court finds

the request to be improperly brought before the Court.

Local Rule 7-1-A-3 indicates that a party may not make a

motion in a response. The focus of this motion relates to

sealing only 11 documents, document 3, 5, 6, 16, 21, 23, 25,

26, 32, 34 and 37. Nothing more.

Moreover, the plaintiffs' motion does not address the applicable standard for maintaining confidentiality designations under the protective order and this Court will, therefore, not address that issue. By way of providing guidance, to maintain confidentiality designations a party must file a motion for a protective order addressing the specific documents for which the party is seeking to maintain its designation and its reasons for doing so.

Where a party seeks a protective order to maintain confidentiality designations of trade secrets or other confidential commercial information, the Court must weigh the risk of disclosure to competitors against the risk that a protective order will impair prosecution or defense of the claims. That standard can be found in the Annie A. versus United Healthcare Insurance case, 2023 WestLaw at 197301, District of Utah case from January 17th of 2023.

The moving party must satisfy a three-factor test by establishing the information sought is a trade secret or other confidential research, development or commercial information and its disclosure might be harmful and the harm

from disclosure outweighs the need for access. It is the Court's expectation that any future request addressing confidentiality designations be procedurally proper and address the relevant standard.

As for the request before the Court today in ECF-110, the plaintiffs' motion is styled as a motion to seal and, therefore, references the standard for sealing documents under local Rule 5-1, which requires a, quote, showing of good cause, end quote. That comes from local Rule 5-3-A-1. Under this standard and for the reasons stated in the motion as to why each of the listed documents was designated confidential, the Court finds the request is narrowly tailored to protect only the specific information deserving protection pursuant to local Rule 5-3, and the Court finds good cause to maintain plaintiffs' confidential business information under seal. The Court, therefore, grants the motion.

In doing so, the Court makes it clear it has not addressed the separate issue of whether the confidential designation should remain as that issue was not properly before the Court. If a motion for a protective order is filed, it must be done so after meeting and conferring and discussing the relevant legal standard between the parties and then a motion may be filed.

With respect to the plaintiffs' motion to protect

confidentiality designations, ECF-111, in addition to being denied for failure to meet and confer, the Court finds that there is not a specific request to designate specific documents but, rather, a frustration on the communications over the designations. The parties are reminded to adhere to the standard protective order and to follow the procedure to protect any documents and file appropriate motions focusing on the relevant legal standards.

With respect to the plaintiffs' motion regarding the document dump, ECF-114, in addition to being denied for failure to meet and confer, the Court adds that in the opposition the defendants indicate that with respect to production nine, P-R-O-D 009, that there was a misunderstanding with the production vendor and the text messages were not culled by search terms. The defendants at the time were working on that issue and intended to replace production nine with a, quote, substantially narrower, end quote, production, which appears to moot the plaintiffs' motion and concern.

The Court reiterates that had there been a meet and confer as required by our rules, the parties should have discussed this and perhaps the motion would not have been needed to be filed. The Court also cautions that the meet and confer obligation is ongoing. For example, you may have to have multiple discussions to make sure what your

respective positions and understandings are and after a reasonable time seek court intervention.

With respect to the plaintiffs' motion to compel the third-party inspection of devices, ECF-116, in addition to failing to meet and confer, the Court also finds that the motion is based on speculation of spoliation with no factual or legal basis. The Court also notes that the plaintiffs' examples contain documents already produced by the defendants, as this motion is not properly supported and for this additional reason the motion is denied.

With respect to the motion for the protective order regarding the Martin Fasser Heeg deposition, ECF-121, the Court has a written ruling which it will issue today, and that ruling is an order denying plaintiffs' short form discovery motion for a protective order requiring that the deposition of Martin Fasser Heeg proceed remotely.

By way of summary, the Court in that written ruling addresses the relevant standard which the parties can read, but the Court also adds that Mr. Heeg verified the amended complaint, is a named party by way of a third-party complaint, and has not demonstrated any specific detailed costs to him personally that are not customary in litigation and the Court, therefore, orders the Heeg deposition to proceed in person. The written ruling will be issued right after this hearing and available on the docket to see the

Court's full basis for the ruling.

That addresses -- with the exception of ECF-68, I believe I have addressed all of the outstanding motions.

Ms. Diamond, from your perspective is that correct and/or do you have anything to add?

MS. DIAMOND: That is correct.

The only thing I would add is on the document dump short form motion, that would be docket number 114, it actually was not correct that a replacement production was provided. Until last night at about 11:00 p.m. defendants' counsel sent us a sheet of documents that they said we could -- you know, here is what you should use and then we should then do the filtering ourselves. So it is not actually correct as stated in their July 25th response that they would be going through the documents one by one and reproducing a narrative production within days. I just wanted to update the Court with regard to that development.

With regard to docket number ECF-128, the overbroad subpoenas, I wanted to update the Court that we have a third-party deposition of Mr. Brelove that has been scheduled for October 22nd. We had initially noticed that for September 26th. On August 13th we noticed that deposition date and then a few days before defendants' counsel said that they were not available and requested that it be taken -- postponed rather. So we did postpone that,

but I just wanted to update the Court so that we can kind of get that onto the record that that is proceeding and that we rescheduled it based on Mr. Pehrson's stated availability as well as the availability of the third-party witness and his counsel.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Pehrson?

MR. PEHRSON: I just want to comment on the document issue. The issue with the initial production is that it was overinclusive.

THE COURT: Sorry. I need to know which ECF you're talking about. Are you talking about 114?

MR. PEHRSON: Yes, the one labeled document dump. That did require longer interactions with our discovery vendor than initially anticipated in our brief, but those were initiated at that time and they were ongoing. It was determined that all of the relevant documents and the responsive documents had been produced, so they already had them and we provided a list of those, and so we deemed that to be sufficient. Reproducing those documents would just require additional expense that was not deemed necessary.

THE COURT: Mr. Pehrson, in your motion, and I'm looking at -- sorry. In your opposition, so ECF-112, it indicates and you have filed a pleading indicating that you are expeditiously combing the documents in question and

doing a document by document review of them. Rymark expects 1 2 to replace production nine with a substantially narrower 3 production of text messages within the coming days, which will then moot the plaintiffs' motion. 4 5 The Court took that representation at face value 6 because you put it in the pleading. 7 Is that what you have done? 8 MR. PEHRSON: I believe that is substantively what 9 happened, Your Honor, yes. We listed the documents which they already had, right, so --10 THE COURT: This says that you're going to replace 11 12 it with a substantially narrower production of text 13 messages. 14 Has that been done? 15 MR. PEHRSON: Your Honor, you're asking me to 16 reproduce text messages that have already been produced. 17 THE COURT: I am not asking you to reproduce them. 18 I am asking you if you have done what you have represented in this pleading? This pleading says that you are going to 19 20 replace them with a substantially narrower production. 21 Have you done that? 22 MR. PEHRSON: I believe so, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: How have you done that? 24 MR. PEHRSON: Your Honor, yesterday we sent a 25 letter to opposing counsel identifying 1,100 Bates numbers

that hit on the search terms from the prior production, and I consider that to be a replacement of that production.

If you would like me to reprint those Bates numbers and send them those documents over again, I'm happy to do that, but they already have that along with the list that I conveyed to them, which I believed fits my description there. If Your Honor disagrees with me I'm happy to do it any way that you state, but I don't think that there was nothing untoward in what happened there.

THE COURT: Ms. Diamond?

MS. DIAMOND: It was not a replacement production. A replacement production would have been producing it in the same way where it is something that we could give to our document vendor to then process. We were given last night, you know, 12 hours before this hearing, a list, as Mr. Pehrson says, of 1,100 documents. Well, then we have to go back to our document team and they have to go through and filter it. It is not a replacement production and that was July 25th that that statement was made. So now we're at October 2nd, so it is certainly not any day. It has been a lot of time and we have been paying the hosting charges on these 17,000 plus documents that were in his initial prod nine.

THE COURT: Thank you.

So, Mr. Pehrson, you have indicated, consistent

with the representation that you made in ECF-122, that you would be willing to replace that production with a substantially narrower production, which has not been done, so I will order you to do that and I will order that to be done within 15 days of today's date, where you replace that production with the narrower production that complies with whatever culling that you did and that you think meets your obligation. Again, that is to be done within 15 days.

I will say, Mr. Pehrson, that this motion was filed back in July, on July 18th, and your opposition was filed on July 25th, and it did say that text messages would be coming within the coming days, which suggests to me that would have been done much sooner than today. So I want to stress to the parties that I do expect when representations are made in pleadings that you comply with those representations. The coming days is not October 2nd. That is also not timely. I know that you have a lot of back and forth going on between you on what needs to be produced and what is to be outstanding, but I have indicated the Court's expectation that the parties engage professionally.

I want to stress that before you engage you should look at the relevant standard that applies, because it seems to me that if you focus on the relevant standard and then whatever the factual situation is between the two of you, and discuss that in your in person meet and confers,

hopefully you'll be able to focus in on the relevant issues.

It is clear that a lot of these motions were filed in a haphazard manner because, as I have indicated, much of the relevant standards are not even being addressed, which is ultimately not helpful to me in trying to give you all the guidance and orders that you need. So I want to stress that things need to be done much more timely going forward.

I have already indicated that you are to have in person meet and confers and we'll have you all switch back and forth in terms of hosting them at your respective offices so that there is no concern there. I will start first with the plaintiffs hosting and then go to the defendants and then go back and forth, so it is clear that that should also not be a source of any contention.

With respect to the October 22nd deposition which you indicated was already postponed, the Court will require the meet and confer that I told you in the guidance that I gave you on that specific motion, but also the other ones, the Court also does require that meet and confer to take place -- give me a second -- by October 14th of this month.

So that meeting, Mr. Christiansen, should be set by you before then so that you can all discuss whatever the other outstanding issues are and then get any motions before the Court.

It was my hope and expectation, obviously, that I

could have gotten you this guidance before now, but my calendar just has not facilitated that. As I told you, I have a criminal docket that takes precedence and I just came off the criminal rotation and so that takes up all of my time.

Is there anything else that we need to discuss, with the expectation that I do expect you all to play nice in the sandbox? It is clear that that is not happening and I am not sure why. I know there are clients on the line and you should take that back to your clients that I also expect that from them as well, because I am stressing contempt of court if I get any more motions where you have not legitimately met and conferred.

Ms. Diamond, anything else that we need to address from your perspective?

MS. DIAMOND: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Pehrson?

MR. RICHARDS: Just briefly, Your Honor, if I may. Is it the Court's expectation -- certainly it is your aspiration is that we will resolve all of this. In the event that we can't resolve a small number of things, is it the Court's expectation that we continue to use the short form motion process to bring these things to the Court?

THE COURT: Mr. Richards, I think it depends on

the type of issue, right? Sometimes it does require, and it

sounds like one of the briefs that you anticipated filing had more meatier, substantive things to discuss, you know, and I have found if it covers privileged issues, confidentiality issues, waiver issues, that those are hard to address in a short form motion just because of the limitations on the number of words and pages, and so usually when I get motions like that I order the full briefing, and that option is obviously available to you to do that.

I do recognize that I pulled the most recent scheduling order and you still have some time, right? You still have some time, but if it is necessary to file something outside of the short form, certainly we could try to get it on our calendar much more quickly than you were able to get all of these on our calendar. When I have the criminal rotation, there is just so much work there to do and I have to get those resolved and they have to take precedent over the civil matters.

MR. RICHARDS: That is helpful. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. With that we will conclude the hearing.

Yes?

MS. DIAMOND: I'm sorry, Your Honor.

I just wanted to clarify, because on our docket number 116, the motion to compel the third-party inspection

of the defendants' devices, that would also be one that I think may warrant a longer form brief rather than the short form. It is docket 116.

THE COURT: Hold on one second. Right.

I think probably that is one where you would have to have the longer brief to make sure you're setting out the legal standard and what the Court needs to look at.

MS. DIAMOND: Following the in person meet and confer?

THE COURT: That is correct.

MS. DIAMOND: I'm sorry, but just to go back to this point again about this October 22nd deposition, so it is not — with regard to overbreadth it is not a document subpoena. It is a deposition, and so just to get out ahead of any discussion, I assume, and not I will speak for them, but I assume that the defendants' position will be that they do not want the deposition to go forward, and our position is that it is highly relevant and we do want it to go forward, and so given that we have already moved this to accommodate Mr. Pehrson's schedule, I am just trying to see if there is any further guidance from the Court with regard to that specific question, the scheduled deposition. Again, it is not a document subpoena. It is just the deposition going forward on that date.

THE COURT: So you're talking about the motion to

quash the overbroad subpoenas, ECF-128.

Is that correct?

MS. DIAMOND: I believe so. There is not a motion to quash that deposition subpoena. Mr. Richards can correct the Court if I am mistaken, but I believe that would fall under the 128 overbroad subpoenas generally.

THE COURT: I did deny that, and I certainly can't speak to the specific October 22nd deposition, right, you have noticed that up and nobody has moved to do anything with respect to that.

What I can say is when I looked at the subpoenas in reference to ECF-128 the categories did appear to be very broad, as the defendants pointed out in their opposition, and perhaps duplicative of information that they were willing to provide or consider providing, and it looks like that wasn't discussed and, therefore, perhaps not necessary.

I don't know what that specific subpoena is about. I do recognize that under Rule 26 the standard for discovery is relevant information, which is pretty broad, and I follow that rule to the letter of the law, right? I think one of you cited one of the cases that I had where I found that it was not relevant, and I would say that that was an employment dispute, and I remember that case because that case also resulted in a sanctions award against the attorney. That was a case where it was an employment

dispute, and if I recall correctly, they were asking to depose family members and the spouse of the defendant who was alleged to have engaged in inappropriate conduct with his subordinates. It was clear that they were doing that to harass that family. So that was the basis of my ruling. I didn't think that that was an appropriate mechanism for them to do that. So I tell you that because I know you cited that case, but that appeared to be a particularly egregious set of circumstances, and Rule 26 is generally construed very broadly and so that is the guidance I can give you. I am not sure if that helps.

MS. DIAMOND: Yes.

On this October 22nd deposition, again, it is not a P and P and there are not topics and there are not documents being requested, it is just the deposition of the relationship partner for an auditor between 2022 and 2023.

THE COURT: What I will say is that they have not moved to quash it yet, so from my perspective I have nothing to say otherwise that it should not be taken.

MS. DIAMOND: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Again, a reminder. I recognize that this is a serious subject matter and it is very important to the parties and there is nothing wrong with having a different perspective and a different position, but I do think it is necessary for the parties to

make sure, when they are talking through these issues, that you're looking at the relevant legal standard that applies compared to whatever the factual situation is, to discuss that to determine if the issues can be narrowed or if you really do have to bring a concern to the Court. Again, we're here for legitimate business disputes, but I do expect the parties to engage professionally with one another. With that we'll conclude the hearing and be in Thank you. recess. MS. DIAMOND: Thank you, Your Honor. (Hearing concluded.)